be disadvantaged. Tradeoffs of this type are not competitive ex ante; if the gamble offered by the risky intervention is sufficiently attractive, it may be in every patient's interest ex ante to receive the risky treatment -despite the fact that, ex post, there will be winners and losers.
In their paper, "Decide as You Would with Full Information! An Argument against ex ante Pareto,"
2 Marc Fleurbaey and Alex Voorhoeve argue against a popular principle for deciding how to act in cases involving tradeoffs of this latter kind. According to Ex Ante Pareto: "if an alternative has higher expected utility for every person than every other alternative, then this alternative should be chosen." (Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve, 2) .
Despite its prima facie plausibility, Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve believe that ex ante Pareto violates a "basic principle of rationality", the Principle of Full Information. In this chapter, I critically examine the key claims of their paper.
Three Cases
The core argument of Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve's paper is built around three stylized cases, summarized in Figure 1 . In each of these cases, Teresa, a medical decision-maker, has to decide which of two medicines to produce and administer to one or more young children, in order to prevent them from going completely blind (utility = 0.6).
In SINGLE-PERSON CASE, Teresa must choose whether to give Adam medicine M E , which will make him considerably visually impaired with certainty (utility = 0.8), or the risky medicine M P , which gives him a 50% chance of retaining excellent vision (utility = 1) at the cost of a 50% chance of becoming severely visually impaired (utility = 0.65).
Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve maintain that Teresa has good moral reason to take this gamble on Adam's behalf, since M P gives him greater expected utility than M E . In cases involving only a single individual, reasoning in accord with ex ante Pareto is morally unproblematic.
In VISUAL IMPAIRMENT CASE 2, Teresa must treat two children. While M E would
give both Adam and Bill 0.8 for sure, M U will allow Adam to achieve 1, while giving Bill 0.65 with certainty. The trade-off here is competitive ex ante, since only Adam will gain from Teresa's choosing M U over M P , whereas Bill is sure to be disadvantaged by this decision.
Action Person
States of the world (equiprobable). 
Figure 1
The key case for Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve, however, is VISUAL IMPAIRMENT CASE By contrast, Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve aim to show that "an egalitarian who (…) cares both about reducing outcome inequality and about increasing individuals' wellbeing" ought to reject the conclusion suggested by ex ante Pareto (Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve, 6) . In a footnote to this passage, they add: "our argument against ex ante
Pareto is equally effective if one instead gives priority to the worse off because one is a Prioritarian, who gives additional weight to utility gains when they occur at a lower level of absolute utility."
3 Economists and decision-theorists sometimes draw the following distinction between "uncertainty" and "risk": Situations involving risk have an unknown outcome, but we do know the underlying distribution of different possible outcomes and their respective probabilities. In cases of uncertainty, the outcome is also unknown, but we don't know what the underlying distribution looks like. In the following, I depart from this convention. To me, "risk" will signify the likelihood, probabilistically quantified, of some (bad) outcome occurring. "Uncertainty" is the epistemic predicament of not knowing which outcome will occur. However, as I understand the latter term, it does not imply ignorance about the probabilities of the various possible outcomes. 4 Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve do not specify the causal mechanism by which the effects of medicine M P come to be perfectly inversely correlated, rather than being (as would be more common in medicine), probabilistically independent. This stylized assumption need not detain us, however. The moral problem that Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve aim to investigate also arises under more realistic conditions. Even when the individual outcomes of a risky action are probabilistically independent, we can often predict, with a high degree of confidence, the overall pattern of individual outcomes that will arise -as long as the number of individuals affected is reasonably large. Hence, in population-level bioethics and other areas of public policy, the Law of Large Numbers often does the work that the assumption of perfectly inverse correlation does in Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve's example.
On the strength of these passages alone, it may seem like Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve have set themselves an excessively simple task in their paper. Both outcome (or 'telic') egalitarianism and prioritarianism are impersonal principles, which rank outcomes based solely on their overall pattern of distribution. If we assume the truth of one of these positions, it is not hard to see that this will contradict the deliverances of ex ante Pareto.
A plausible outcome-egalitarianism will clearly recommend that Teresa pick M E in VISUAL IMPAIRMENT CASE 1, since this achieves an equal distribution at only a small loss in total well-being. Prioritarianism gives the same verdict, since under M E the worst-off fare considerably better than under M P .
If this were the extent of Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve's opposition to ex ante Pareto, it would be of limited dialectical power. It would "defeat" ex ante Pareto simply by assuming the truth of an impersonal position that implies its falsity. Such a move would be only as strong as the outcome egalitarian or prioritarian intuitions that underlie it; it is fair to assume that it would fail to persuade a committed proponent of ex ante Pareto. Voorhoeve that, in addition to making our action justifiable to every person, we may also have reason to attend to impersonal concerns, such as outcome equality or priority for the worst-off. (I return to these points in the final section of this response). My aim in this chapter is merely to show that, to the extent that these impersonal concerns are valid in VISUAL IMPAIRMENT CASE 1, they pull in the opposite direction as arguments from justifiability to each person.
The Argument from Omniscient Guardians
Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve consider the Argument from the Single-Person Case, but attempt to rebut it with the following argument, which I summarize from their paper:
Whenever possible, Teresa ought to base her decision on what fully informed guardians would ask her to do on their charges' behalf. Unlike Teresa, such omniscient guardians know which of s 1 and s 2 obtains, and would thus be able to object to Teresa's choice of M P if they foresaw that it was contrary to their charge's "true interest". If Teresa was able to consult such omniscient guardians and was informed by one of them that his charge would lose out under M P , she would no longer regard it as justifiable to his charge to select M P , since this would mean knowingly sacrificing the interests of someone who, as things turn out, will be no better off than the other person under either policy in order to make that other person better off still).
In reality, of course, Teresa does not know which state of the world obtains;
however, she does know for sure that one of s 1 and s 2 obtains. Consequently, Teresa can infer that, if she were advised by fully informed guardians, she would necessarily regard the choice of M P as unjustifiable to either Adam of Bill.
Moreover, when she can, Teresa should therefore adopt the judgments about the justifiability to each that she can infer she would have under full information.
Despite not knowing which state of the world obtains, Teresa ought, therefore, to conclude that giving M P fails the test of justifiability to each person.
Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve claim that this conclusion is required by a "basic principle of rationality", which they dub the Principle of Full Information, Part I: "When one knows that, in every state of the world with positive probability, one would rightly rank two alternatives in a particular way, then one should so rank them." (Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve, 11) .
What are we to make of this argument? (4) Therefore, Teresa can infer that, with full information, she would always regard her choosing M P as unjustifiable to either Adam or Bill.
(5) Judgments made with full information about a person's interests are superior to judgments made with lack of information.
(6) When she can, Teresa should therefore adopt the judgments about the justifiability to each that she can infer she would have under full information.
(7) Teresa can infer and adopt these fully informed judgments about justifiability.
Therefore, Teresa should regard choosing M P as unjustifiable to either Adam or to Bill.
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The critical step in this argument is the move from (5) the book on this question, however, it will pay to take a brief detour via the arguments of another philosopher, to see whether a better case could not be made against using ex ante
Pareto to resolve ex post tradeoffs like VISUAL IMPAIRMENT CASE 1.
The Argument from Certain Loss
In "Contractualism and Aggregation", Sophia Reibetanz proposes an account of contractualist justification under conditions of uncertainty that would provide a different basis for rejecting ex ante Pareto. She writes:
As long as we know that acceptance of a principle will affect someone in a certain way, we should assign that person a complaint that is based upon the full magnitude of the harm or benefit, even if we cannot identify the person in advance. It is only if we do not know whether acceptance of a principle will affect anyone in a certain way that we should allocate each individual a complaint based upon his expected harms and benefits under that principle. (Reibetanz 1998, 304) In Perhaps there are other ways in which Teresa's knowledge of the eventual pattern of outcomes might matter? For instance, it might be claimed that if Teresa knows for sure that someone will be disadvantaged from her choice of M P , then selecting M P nonetheless shows too little concern for the eventual loser.
This complaint also misses its mark. It might be argued, with some justification, that choosing M P shows too little concern for avoiding that there will be a loser. This, however, expresses a preoccupation with the overall outcome, as it would arise from an impersonal moral principle such as telic egalitarianism or the priority view. By contrast,
what cannot be said, either by Adam or by Bill, is that Teresa's choice shows too little concern for avoiding that he will be a loser. Again: Teresa takes no greater risk with the wellbeing of either patient than she did in SINGLE-PERSON CASE, and there Fleurbaey and
Voorhoeve agreed that taking the gamble on Adam's behalf did not show insufficient concern for his wellbeing. Unequal outcomes are not always evidence of unequal concern or treatment, especially when they are produced by a risky causal mechanism.
In sum: It appears that in VISUAL IMPAIRMENT CASE 1, despite her knowledge that her choice of M P is sure to end up disadvantaging someone, Teresa treats both patients in just the way she ought to, were she acting on their behalf alone. She gives them the same attractive gamble as in SINGLE-PERSON CASE; and she shows each the same concern that she had for Adam in that case. All told, it is hard to see how the fact Teresa can predict the overall pattern could affect Adam or Bill's grounds for reasonable rejection. The
Argument from Certain Loss fails, because it conflates the moral significance of "Teresa knows for sure that someone will lose" with "there is someone who Teresa knows for sure will lose".
Remarks on Fairness, Lotteries, and Risk-Taking
So far, I have examined Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve's arguments in Sections I to III of their paper, where they sought to establish that, as far as justifiability to each person in terms of their true well-being interests is concerned, selecting the risky option M P in VISUAL IMPAIRMENT CASE 1 is morally on a par with choosing M U in VISUAL IMPAIRMENT CASE 2 (and inferior to picking M E in either case).
However, in Section IV of their essay, Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve explore a way in which M P and M U may differ morally after all: unlike M U , which is certain to benefit
Adam at the cost of certainly setting back Bill's interests, M P gives both patients an equal chance of receiving the benefit of being fully sighted. This may make M P fairer than M U .
The fact that M P gives both patients an equal chance of benefiting would be especially significant, Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve maintain, if we subscribed to what David Wasserman (1996) calls a "distributive" view of equal chances. As Fleurbaey and
Voorhoeve characterize this view, "a given outcome inequality among people with equally strong claims to a benefit is less unfair when each person has a chance to end up better off than when the worse off have no such chance, because in receiving this chance, each person receives an equal share of something of expected value." (Wasserman 1996, 16) . (Call the kind of unfairness that is avoided by giving the patients equal chances of being fully sighted "procedural unfairness"). If the distributive view is sound, this would make M P morally preferable to M U , at least in terms of procedural fairness.
I do not disagree with Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve that M P may indeed be preferable to M U on account of its greater fairness (though I would not have treated this as a consideration which is separate from the question of justifiability to each person).
However, Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve make two further claims which I believe deserve critical scrutiny. I will first elaborate these claims and then address them in reverse order.
Claim 1: The outcome inequality produced by M P is unfair, to some extent.
If the distributive view is correct, Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve maintain, this increases the moral distance between M P and M U . How different we deem M P and M U to be from one another depends on how much the unfairness of inequality produced by M P "is mitigated by the fact that the severely impaired person had a one in two chance of instead ending up unimpaired which is equal to the chance that the unimpaired person had of instead ending up with the severe impairment." (Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve, 19 ; emphasis mine).
The italicized passage suggests that, for Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve, despite being procedurally fair by giving Adam and Bill an equal chance of obtaining the benefit of being fully sighted, M P may still suffer from residual unfairness according to the distributive view, on account of the unequal outcome it produces. 13 I will return to this point below. contrast, Teresa should not sacrifice much total utility for the sake of the worst off, then the fact that the equal chances offered by M P mitigate the associated outcome-unfairness may tip the balance in its favour. (Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve, 19) The problem with this second claim is not that I take it to be false, but that I do not see how Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve are entitled to it, given their preceding arguments.
Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve state explicitly that the Argument from Omniscient
Guardians appeals only to Adam and Bill's welfare interests, and that these do not include considerations of fairness: "We will assume that these reasons of self-interest do not include an interest in being fairly treated in the distributive process. This assumption makes it possible to represent fairness considerations separately from well-being considerations." (Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve, 5 (2005), do defend similar positions. Furthermore, like Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve, Lang maintains that even perfect procedural fairness need not make an action entirely fair. Besides being unfair by giving people unequal chances of benefiting, Lang argues, an action can also be unfair in virtue of the unequal outcome it produces. He writes: "Outcomes, as well as chances, matter to fairness. To put it in another way, expected harm is not the only thing that matters, even when we are considering fairness, rather than goodness. Actual harm matters too. After all, a morally significant result of being awarded an equal chance of being saved is that you might get to be saved. So why should not the prevalence of actual harm be relevant to an assessment of fairness?" (Lang 2005, 336 The distributive account of fairness, with its distinction between procedural and outcome unfairness, was put forward by Wasserman and Lang as a possible explanation for the moral importance of lotteries in the allocation of scarce, indivisible goods. These are situations in which two or more claimants are entitled to some good in equal measure, but where an "equal division of the good to which they have a claim is not possible or can only be achieved with a significant loss of value." (Wasserman 1996, 30) In such contexts, it is not implausible that even a procedurally fair lottery, which assigns the scarce good to one claimant but not the other, cannot remove a residue of outcome unfairness. Using a lottery to give both individuals an equal chance of receiving the good only assigns them equal chances of being treated unequally, since only one of them will receive the good, whereas the other will not. Since the good in question cannot be divided without losing most of its value, there is no way in which both claimants could have satisfied their claims to a significant degree. It is unavoidable that, through no fault of their own, one of the individuals won't have their claim to the good satisfied. I then examined an alternative argument, the Argument from Certain Loss, adapted from the writings of Sophia Reibetanz, which suggests a different way in which a contractualist may object to ex ante Pareto. This argument, I tried to show, is also unsuccessful. It conflates the moral significance of "Teresa knows for sure that someone will lose" with "there is someone who Teresa knows for sure will lose".
Finally, I briefly considered Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve's remarks on fairness from the fourth section of their chapter. I agreed with them that the fact that M P gives both patients an equal chance of retaining excellent vision, whereas M U does not, increases the moral distance between these two options. But, contra Fleurbaey and Voorhoeve, I argued that -by the lights of their own earlier argument -this fact could not make it the case that, all things considered, we ought to prefer M P to M E in VISUAL IMPAIRMENT CASE 1. 
